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Abstract
QBism is an agent-centered interpretation of quantum theory. It rejects the notion
that quantum theory provides a God’s eye description of reality and claims instead
that it imposes constraints on agents’ subjective degrees of belief. QBism’s emphasis
on subjective belief has led critics to dismiss it as antirealism or instrumentalism, or
even, idealism or solipsism. The aim of this paper is to consider the relation of QBism
to scientific realism. I argue that while QBism is an unhappy fit with a standard
way of thinking about scientific realism, an alternative conception I call “perspectival
normative realism” may allow for a reconciliation.
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1 Introduction
QBism is an interpretation inspired by the central role played by information in contem-
porary applications of quantum theory. Accordingly, the emphasis of QBists is on the
application of quantum theory by agents intervening on the world. The starting idea of
QBism—which originally stood for “quantum Bayesianism”—is that the probabilities de-
livered by quantum theory are to be understood as degrees of belief along the lines of
the subjective Bayesian approach to probability (Caves et al., 2002). Since its original
proposal, the view has evolved and attracted new followers in the physics community, but
has been less warmly received by philosophers. Many, it seems, share the view of Hagar
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(2003) that “Fuchs’ ‘thin’ realism, and the entire ‘fog from the north’ which inspires it,
are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise” (p.772).1 However, this is at odds with the
avowed realism of QBists such as Fuchs (2017b) and Mermin (2014).
The aim of this paper is to clarify the status of QBism with respect to scientific realism.
I argue that QBism’s claim to realism can be justified by understanding the view as a form
of perspectival normative realism. This issue is of importance not just for those with an
interest in QBism and other “non-ontic” approaches to quantum theory (e.g., Boge (2018);
Friederich (2013, 2015); Healey (2012, 2017b)), but also serves to test the limits of scientific
realism in the context of quantum theory. QBism proposes a non-standard understanding
of the relation of a scientific theory to the world, and as such, casts the question of realism
in a new light. At the very least, the following investigation should make clear that the
question of realism about quantum theory is more complex than it may at first seem.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces QBism and some of its motivations.
Next, section 3 considers whether QBism can be viewed as a form of standard scientific
realism. The upshot of that discussion is that QBism, while not inconsistent with it, is
an unhappy fit with this conception of scientific realism. In particular, standard scientific
realism fails to adequately account for the perspectival and normative aspects of QBism.
These aspects of the view are discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Taking these
aspects seriously leads to a novel conception of scientific realism: perspectival normative
realism, which provides the basis for a better understanding of QBism. Section 6 concludes
1Compared to other interpretations (e.g., Everett, de Broglie-Bohm, GRW), QBism has received con-
siderably less attention from philosophers. Among those who have engaged with QBism, most have done
so with the aim of highlighting problems with the view (Bacciagaluppi, 2014; Brown, 2019; Earman, 2019;
Norsen, 2016). Even Timpson (2008), who defends QBism from the charges of idealism and solipsism, also
points to its explanatory shortcomings. Note that these authors do not necessarily agree with Hagar’s
“instrumentalism in disguise” claim, but it remains commonplace among philosophers to take QBism to be
opposed to scientific realism. For example, in his Stanford Encyclopedia entry Myrvold (2018) categorizes
QBism as a “non-realist approach to quantum mechanics.”
2Cf., Healey (2020), who attempts to broaden the understanding of scientific realism along pragmatist
lines to accommodate his account of quantum theory.
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by arguing that, so understood, QBism is able to meet the realist demands appropriate for
quantum theory.
2 What is QBism?
The empirical support for quantum theory consists in the success of its probabilistic pre-
dictions. Every opportunity taken to test quantum theory has vindicated its predictions
over those of potential rivals. In the standard formalism, these predictions follow from the
quantum state ascribed to a system and the Born rule. QBism maintains that these prob-
abilities are subjective degrees of belief of some agent concerning what she will experience,
e.g., upon performing a measurement of some observable. Moreover, the sole function of the
quantum state is to encode the agent’s information (or subjective beliefs) associated with
the system.3 So why would one adopt this kind of subjectivist interpretation of quantum
theory?
There are several kinds of arguments put forth by QBists. One family of arguments
notes the unifying power of taking the quantum state to be epistemic. The idea is that
certain puzzling features of quantum theory follow naturally from an epistemic approach.
A notable example here is Spekkens (2007), which seeks to show that a purely classical
theory—Spekkens’s toy model—can reproduce a number of “quantum” effects if states
are understood epistemically. For example, the no cloning theorem that prohibits perfect
duplication of a quantum state is shown to hold in the toy model. Of course, Spekkens’s
3The QBist should avoid saying that the quantum state encodes beliefs about the system because this
suggests that the system has an underlying ontic state that is the target of the agent’s beliefs. As discussed
below, this “Ψ-epistemic ontological model”(Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010) runs into difficulties, such as
the no go theorem of (Pusey et al., 2012). So, strictly speaking, the quantum state encodes an agent’s
beliefs about their future experiences that are associated with the physical system—e.g., what they will
experience when performing a measurement of it. That said, it will often be useful to speak of “measurement
outcomes” and “the quantum state of a system,” which should be taken to be elliptical for more careful
expressions of the sort just mentioned.
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model is quite limited in its application and cannot recover the full content of quantum the-
ory. Nevertheless, QBists maintain that it goes far enough to demonstrate the explanatory
virtues of an epistemic view of quantum states; features such as no-cloning that appear
unexplained or ad hoc on the ontic view are given a natural explanation on the epistemic
view.4
The other sort of argument maintains that various conceptual puzzles that dog the
interpretation of quantum theory are dissolved by adopting the subjective epistemic view-
point. According to advocates, the process of measurement and the presence of non-local
phenomena are described simply and without paradox by QBism. Measurement involves
simply updating one’s subjective beliefs about future experiences on the basis of new infor-
mation. Non-locality doesn’t arise in an EPR experiment because each agent–Alice, Bob,
an agent at the source—has their own quantum state which reflects their individual beliefs.
A distant measurement has no effect on an agent’s beliefs (until they become aware of it),
so nothing in the vicinity of Bob changes when Alice performs her measurement.5
QBism also manages to avoid the various “no go” results surrounding epistemic ap-
proaches. For instance, the PBR theorem (Pusey et al., 2012) rules out a version of the
epistemic approach in which the quantum state represents our uncertainty about the un-
derlying ontic state of a physical system. QBism avoids the PBR theorem by rejecting this
understanding of epistemic states. QBism rejects that there is an underlying ontic state
4It’s not entirely clear that QBists can appeal to the explanatory power of Spekkens’s toy model given
that the latter presupposes the ontological models framework that QBists reject. Fuchs indicates that
Spekkens’s toy model provides a general sense in which “far from being an appendage cheaply tacked on to
the theory, the idea of quantum states as information has a simple unifying power that goes some way toward
explaining why the theory has the very mathematical structure it does” (Fuchs, 2010, 3). However, much
of that unifying power seems to depend on the “Ψ-epistemic ontological model” conception of quantum
states mentioned in the previous footnote. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
5This does not preclude the presence of some form of non-locality. For instance, one may argue that
when Alice and Bob compare results, they will find non-local correlations in measurement outcomes. The
QBist may wish to treat such a revelation as simply Alice performing another (local) measurement, but
doing so relegates Bob’s testimony to merely an aspect of Alice’s experience, arguably moving us closer to
solipsism (see, Norsen (2016); Earman (2019)).
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about which we are unsure, rather, it contends that we have degrees of belief about our
own future experiences only. This may lead to charges of idealism or solipsism, but the
QBist need only deny that quantum states encode credences over unknown ontic states of
the physical systems to which they are applied. The QBist is free to believe that objective
reality exists and that quantum theory can tell us about it in some other, more indirect
manner.
In sum, QBism offers an account of quantum theory in which agents use the theory to
guide their degrees of belief about potential future experiences. QBists reject the standard
realist assumption that to interpret quantum theory is to say how it describes external
reality. Indeed, QBists often forsake the external, “God’s eye” perspective altogether in
favor of a diversity of different agent-centered perspectives on the quantum world.
3 QBism as Standard Scientific Realism?
While there remains disagreement about the correct formulation of scientific realism, many
follow Psillos (1999) in identifying three main components of the view, roughly:
Metaphysical realism: a recognition of the existence of a mind-independent reality;
Semantic realism: a commitment to interpret theories literally;
Epistemic claim: a commitment to the approximate truth of our best confirmed theories.
As noted above, QBism is occasionally dismissed as solipsism or idealism. After all,
on this view quantum theory functions as a user’s manual that guides an agent’s beliefs
about their own future experiences. However, the QBist needn’t deny that there is a reality
external to the agent. Indeed, Fuchs offers the following support for metaphysical realism:
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We believe in a world external to ourselves precisely because we find ourselves
getting unpredictable kicks (from the world) all the time. (Fuchs, 2017b)
What QBism denies is that models in quantum theory should be viewed as third-personal
descriptions of external reality, but this doesn’t bear on metaphysical realism, which they
are free to adopt for other reasons. Assessing the status of the other two aspects of
standard scientific realism with respect to QBism is less straightforward. First, consider
semantic realism. The requirement to take a theory literally fits most naturally with
scientific theories presented in linguistic form, where semantic realism is intended to rule
out views such as logical positivism that seek to reinterpret certain sentences so as to
avoid making reference to putative unobservable entities. It’s unclear, however, how to
apply this idea to the formalism and mathematical models that are the target of quantum
interpretations.6 For instance, Wallace (2012, 13) claims that taking quantum theory
literally yields a multiverse of quasi-classical worlds, but others reject this characterization.
Indeed, QBists may argue that their view is the result of “accepting the Bell/EPR analysis
at face value” (Caves et al., 2007, 270) or taking literally what founders like Bohr said
about the theory (Fuchs, 2017a).7 These examples demonstrate the ambiguity involved in
the concept of a “literal construal” of quantum theory.
Second, the concept of approximate truth that figures in the epistemic claim also re-
quires explication. In the context of a linguistically-presented scientific theory, perhaps
this can be made out in terms of the successful reference of central terms (Laudan, 1981),
6On van Fraassen’s (1980) presentation of the semantic view, there is a clear sense in which models
may be taken literally, but this is because the models in question already presuppose a specific physical
interpretation. In the case of quantum theory, the models van Fraassen has in mind are ways the world
could be that satisfy the quantum axioms (1980, p.65). However, this notion of models isn’t applicable
to the requirement of semantic realism as it applies to an interpretation of quantum theory like QBism.
Here what is needed is a notion of literal construal applicable to the models that form the common target
of quantum interpretation—say, density operators on Hilbert space—not the models that result from such
an interpretation. For a recent discussion of van Fraassen’s understanding of quantum interpretation that
touches on literalism, see Wolff (2020).
7Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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but on a model-based approach the notion is harder to pin down. One must locate some
relation between models and the world capable of playing an analogous role to successful
reference in the linguistic case.
A popular approach is to adopt a form of selective scientific realism, which maintains
that our best theories can tell us about the world, but is careful to distinguish elements
of theoretical models that are genuine reflections of reality from those that are merely
artifacts of the representation. This task requires substantial interpretative work and its
results are often controversial, but so long as one preserves the sense that models have
latched onto the structure of the world, one preserves the standard conception of scientific
realism: there is an external reality and our theories, taken literally, accurately describe it
(more or less).
There are several varieties of selective scientific realism. Structural realism, for instance,
maintains that models capture only the structure of the world. Thus, individual elements
of theoretical models needn’t correspond to individual entities, but structural or relational
features do have worldly counterparts. For example, Worrall (1989) claims that Fresnel’s
equations do not describe genuine physical properties of a luminiferous ether—as Fresnel
supposed—but rather, reflect the structure underlying optical phenomena. Other versions
of this approach of selective skepticism are possible as well. One might countenance only
entities with certain causal features (Hacking, 1983), or those involved in novel predictive
successes (Psillos, 1999). Any such view of differential ontological commitment counts as
selective scientific realism as understood here.8
Is QBism compatible with selective scientific realism? Initially, one may think not.
After all, QBists deny that core elements of quantum models—quantum states and their
8One might add a further requirement that the extent of ontological commitment must reach some
threshold, below which models are simply too remote from reality to qualify as faithful representations. I
discuss the implications of this for QBism below.
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evolution—correspond to elements of reality. However, Fuchs urges that
...there is more to quantum mechanics than just three isolated terms (states,
evolution, and measurement)—there’s the full-blown theory that glues these
notions together in a very particular way, and in a way that would have never
been discovered without empirical science. (Fuchs, 2017b)
More specifically, recently QBists have placed increasing emphasis on the place of the Born
rule as an objective feature of reality. The Born rule is typically formulated as a function
that takes a quantum state to the probability of an observable taking a certain value or
the occurrence of a certain measurement outcome. For example, one may write the Born
rule for finding an eigenvalue ki of an observable O for a system in a pure state ψ:
p(ki|ψ) = 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 = |〈ki|ψ〉|2 (1)
where Pi is the projection onto the eigenspace of O corresponding to ki. However, given
their focus on subjective probabilities, QBists have sought to eliminate reference to the
misleading quantum state and formulate the Born rule entirely in terms of probabilities,
understood as subjective degrees of belief about (experiences of) measurement outcomes.
The resulting version of the Born rule is what QBists now call the “Essential Representa-
tion” (DeBrota et al., 2020).
The Essential Representation is cast in terms of hypothetical measurements called SICs
(Fuchs, 2010; Fuchs and Schack, 2013). Before describing SICs, we should note that the
Born rule can be stated in terms of more general measurements than those associated with
a projection onto the eigenspace of some Hermitian operator as assumed in equation 1. A
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) is a collection of positive semi-definite operators
Ei on a Hilbert space H such that
∑
iEi = I. In terms of POVMs, the Born rule takes
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the simple form:
p(i|ρ) = trρEi (2)
for an outcome i and an arbitrary quantum state ρ. A SIC is a symmetric, informationally
complete POVM. Formally, a SIC is a set of d2 rank-one projection operators Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi|
on a finite d-dimensional Hilbert space such that |〈ψi|ψj〉|2 = 1d+1 whenever i 6= j. For now,
whether SICs exist for all finite values of d is an open research question.9 But, provided the
relevant SICs exist, we find that an arbitrary quantum state ρ can be expressed in terms








Consider a standard von Neumann measurement with outcomes Dj = |j〉〈j|. Call
the probability for this measurement given by the standard Born rule (equation 2) q(j).
Now, suppose we perform a SIC measurement with outcomes Hi before the von Neumann






where p(i) is the probability of an outcome i of the SIC measurement, r(j|i) is the condi-
tional probability of an outcome j of a subsequent von Neumann measurement conditional
on i, and d is the Hilbert space dimension associated with the system. But, this probability
9So far SICs have been found for dimensions up to 151, with several sparse analytic proofs up to 323.
See Fuchs et al. (2017) and the references therein.
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s(j) differs from the Born rule probability q(j) that applies if the SIC is not performed. In
particular,
q(j) = (d+ 1)s(j)− 1. (5)
Putting these expressions together, we arrive at the Essential Representation of the Born
rule:




The QBist maintains that the Essential Representation (equation 6) provides a more
perspicuous version of the Born rule. Whereas the standard version of the Born rule relates
a quantum state to the probability of a measurement outcome, the Essential Representation
expresses a relation between probabilities associated with different sequences of measure-
ments. According to the QBist, such probabilities should be understood as subjective
degrees of belief, and hence, the Essential Representation functions as a kind of coherence
constraint analogous to the axioms of (classical) probability theory.10 Moreover, this ver-
sion of the Born rule allegedly “correlates with something that one might want to call ‘real’
” (Fuchs, 2017b, p.6), and hence, we may wish to regard QBism as at least committed to
this minimal claim about external reality.11 It is also worth noting that Fuchs claims the
dimension d of the Hilbert space associated with a physical system—which appears in the
Essential Representation—also indicates an objective feature of reality. In particular, it
10I will return to this point in section 5.1 below.
11What is intended by Fuchs here is far from clear. One might try to explicate this idea as a form of
structural realism: the Born rule represents an aspect of the structure of our world. After all, structural
realists frequently associate structure with what is encoded in the equations of physical theories. E.g.:
“On the structural realist view what Newton really discovered are the relationships between phenomena
expressed in the mathematical equations of his theory” (Worrall, 1989, p.122).
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reflects a “previously unnoticed capacity inherent in all matter” (Fuchs, 2010, p.23).12
Selective scientific realism allows for a range of positions depending on what aspects
of models are taken to reflect genuine elements of reality. The present suggestion is that
we locate QBism toward one end of the spectrum—in which almost nothing in the model
corresponds to an element of reality. One may wonder whether such a view may be ap-
propriately regarded as consistent with scientific realism. For some, scientific realism is
equated with a belief in all of the unobservable entities posited by our best scientific theo-
ries. Even if one loosens this requirement somewhat, one may reasonably wonder whether
a view that rejects so much of the apparent ontological commitments of quantum theory
retains any significant portion of this motivating idea.
Another motivating idea for realists is the “no miracles” argument, which contends that
(approximate) truth is required to explain the empirical success of our scientific theories.
Moving away from the linguistic notion of truth as successful reference, we may capture
this idea as the intuition that a model must reflect something in the world for its successful
application to be unsurprising. Again, we may wonder whether merely latching onto one
(albeit fairly central) feature of the world—the Born rule—is sufficient to explain the
astonishing empirical success of quantum theory. Given that the Born rule—especially in
the form of the Essential Representation—is purely relational, it’s hard to see how it could
meet this requirement. In order to generate the probability for a specific measurement
outcome, one must supplement the Born rule with a quantum state or the probability of
the outcome of another (hypothetical) measurement. But, given that these inputs to the
Born rule are purely subjective on QBism, there’s no guarantee that the theory will be
successful.
Even if we put these issues to one side, there are further worries with adopting this
12See section 4.1.
11
perspective on QBism. The main one is that the resulting view is deeply uninformative.
On this understanding, QBism posits an external reality and claims that the Born rule
is (somehow) true of it. If there is nothing more to say, this has the effect of leaving
the metaphysics of our world largely unconstrained. This leads to a view in which reality
is fundamentally “unspeakable”(Timpson, 2008) or “ineffable”(Brown, 2019). Thus, the
metaphysician is free to speculate on what the world is like, which could lead to radically
different ontological pictures. For example, one might arrive at quasi-idealism13 (Brown,
2019), Cartwrightian dispositionalism (Timpson, 2008), Kantianism (Mohrhoff, 2014) or
countless other views.
Thus, the standard picture of scientific realism is an unhappy fit with QBism. If QBism
is a genuine form a scientific realism, it cannot be in virtue of quantum models reflecting
features of the world. The vague appeal to the real correlates of the Born rule (and Hilbert
space dimension) is too thin a basis to support the realist’s demands for explanation and
understanding. One possible conclusion is that QBism simply isn’t a realist view, despite
the urging of its proponents.14 But, there is some reason to resist this implication and
instead challenge the vision of scientific realism on offer. After all, QBism rejects the idea
that an interpretation of quantum theory is exhausted by what it tells us about external
reality. It is unsurprising, then, that it is vague and uninformative when cast in these terms.
13Brown recognizes that “QBism is not strictly idealism in Berkeley’s sense; it does not ‘deny the existence
of an observer-independent reality’,” but he goes on to say, “...I find the ineffable nature of the external
world in QBism troubling, and it is this concern that leads me to make the analogy with George Berkeley’s
metaphysics” (Brown, 2019, 19). The present point is that the very minimal metaphysical commitments of
QBism are compatible with a variety of different views, and even if full-bodied idealism isn’t among them,
Brown suggests a kind of “quasi-idealism” may be.
14Indeed, this is the conclusion drawn by Hagar (2003) and Norsen (2016). Given how little QBism
has to say about reality, Hagar views it as ignoring the measurement problem thus as “instrumentalism
in disguise” (Hagar, 2003, 772). Norsen goes further, labelling QBism “FAPP [for all practical purposes]
solipsism” because it leaves the nature of reality external to the agent largly unconstrained (Norsen, 2016,
10). Even Timpson (2008), who defends QBism’s realist credentials from the charges of solipsism and
instrumentalism, complains that the “unspeakable” nature of reality on QBism gives rise an explanatory
deficit for the view.
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For the QBist, while it may be true that we can glean some modest claims about such a
reality from quantum theory, these are downstream consequences of the interpretation
rather than its essence. This explains why the ineffable world isn’t a problem for the
QBist; understanding what the theory is telling us is divorced from the project of giving a
metaphysics.
4 Perspectivalism
QBists emphasize the first-personal nature of quantum theory as one of the central tenets
of QBism. In distinguishing his view from the Everettian interpretation of Wallace (2012),
Fuchs notes that “...this is one of the most distinguished differences between Everett and
QBism. ‘QBism don’t do third-person!’ For QBism, all of quantum theory is first-person
for the person who happens to be using it” (Fuchs, 2017a, p.22). A common feature of
standard scientific realism is that some features of models should correspond to the world
in a perspective-independent sense. This implies that quantum models provide something
like a God’s eye description of the world. QBism rejects this framework by insisting that
quantum theory only applies at the level of a particular agent embedded in the world in a
particular way.
QBism isn’t entirely unique in this respect. For example, Dieks’s perspectivalism
(Dieks, 2009, 2019) and Rovelli’s relational interpretation (Rovelli, 1996, 1997) also em-
phasize the role of agent perspectives in quantum theory. Both views reject the assumption
of a single, God’s eye quantum state for a given system at a time, but rather, insist on
a plurality of observer-relative quantum states. Despite their essential appeal to observer
perspectives, however, these interpretations still aim to provide a description of external
reality on the basis of quantum theory. In light of this, they may be seen as compatible
with standard scientific realism.
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QBism goes further than these views by rejecting the goal of providing a description
of external reality based in quantum theory. For Rovelli and Dieks, quantum states (and
the properties they encode) are defined relative to agent perspectives. This suggests a
metaphysics in which relational properties replace intrinsic (non-relational) properties for
physical systems. For instance, an electron may be x-spin “up” relative to Alice, but
lack a determinate x-spin relative to Bob. For the QBist, by contrast, quantum theory is
simply not in the business of giving this sort of a description of reality. Thus, the variety of
perspectivalism implicated in QBism must be stronger than merely asserting that quantum
states or properties are defined relative to agent perspectives. The perspectivalism of
QBism holds that quantum theory only applies at the level of agents embedded or situated
in the world.
Following Ismael (2007), we can distinguish between conservative and radical varieties
of perspectivalism. According to conservative perspectivalism about some discourse, a
complete specification of the perspective-free facts together with the situation of the agent
fixes the perspectival facts. For example, claims about what is nearby are fixed by distance
relations and the location of the agent. Radical perspectivalism occurs when this fails—the
perspectival facts don’t supervene on the God’s eye description together with a specification
of the agent’s situation. QBism should be viewed as radical perspectivalism about quantum
theory in contrast to the conservative perspectivalism of Rovelli and Dieks. Even if we
specify the details of an agent’s situation and the God’s eye facts about reality, this doesn’t
fix the quantum model that agent will adopt. Agents in the very same situation may assign
different quantum states to the same system.15
15It could be argued that perspectival facts (e.g., measurement outcomes) ultimately supervene on the
God’s eye facts and the agent’s situation—it’s just that the former are largely unknowable according to
QBism. However, there remains an important difference between QBism and other varieties of perspecti-
valism: Only QBism posits perspectival facts that fail to supervene on the accessible perspective-free facts
together with a suitable specification of the agent’s situation. This reflects the greater autonomy QBism
allows in how agents apply quantum theory to the world. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this
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4.1 The Participatory Universe
The perspectival nature of QBism helps to make sense of another distinctive feature of
QBism. Inspired by John Wheeler, QBists have sought to emphasize the “participatory”
aspect of quantum theory.
When an experimentalist reaches out and touches a quantum system—the pro-
cess usually called quantum ‘measurement’—that process gives rise to a birth.
It gives rise to a little act of creation. And it is how those births or acts of cre-
ation impact the agent’s expectations for other such births that is the subject
matter of quantum theory. (Fuchs, 2017b, p.9)
This talk of measurements as acts of creation suggests a metaphysical picture in which
we construct the world via our interactions with it. This may be further supported by
consideration of the role played by Hilbert space dimension, which figures in the Essential
Representation and which Fuchs (2010) describes as a “universal capacity” of quantum
systems. Indeed, Timpson (2008) suggests an ontology of primitive capacities on the basis
of such considerations. Now, there is nothing obviously anti-realist about a metaphysics in
which humans build the world bit by bit via their interactions with it—if quantum theory
is telling us that this is how reality operates, then as realists we had better endorse it.
But, such a picture does raise a number of questions. If agents construct reality via
their measurements, how do we make sense of different agents performing different mea-
surements with different results? Indeed, the case of Wigner’s friend—usually taken to
support epistemic approaches like QBism—would seem to lead to a paradoxical situation
in which the world is more than one way, or in which Wigner and his friend occupy different




According to QBism, the primary function of quantum theory is to guide agents in their
beliefs, not to describe external reality. This means it is a mistake to elevate what it says
about an individual agent’s experiences to the level of a God’s eye description of the world.
Indeed, a central tenet of the view is that quantum theory can provide no such God’s eye
description. Thus, while it may be true from the perspective of an individual agent that
she creates the world via her measurements, this should not be taken as a metaphysical
proposal about external reality.
Now, one might object that this account doesn’t do justice to the participatory aspect
of QBism. It may seem that the language of “acts of creation” is being dismissed as
mere metaphor rather than a genuine aspect of the quantum world. But, we must recall
that on QBism there is no such thing as the quantum world, at least if that’s taken to
mean the world described by quantum theory. Rather, quantum theory functions as a
guide to agents. The participatory universe and the claim that measurements are acts
of creation, then, should be understood at the level of description of an agent applying
quantum theory to their world. Whether this is true will depend on whether measurements
really are acts of creation, when viewed from the perspective of an agent applying quantum
theory. And this seems plausible. For an agent embedded in a world like ours, quantum
theory instructs them to expect a certain measurement outcome according to the Born rule
probability assigned to it and not to view such measurements as revealing a preexisting
physical property. If this were not the case—say, if there were no superposition principle in
quantum theory—then, it would be false (or at least we would be unjustified in believing)
that measurements are acts of creation. So, it is plausible that features of our world and
features about us as agents combine to make it the case that, from the perspective of an
agent using quantum theory, measurements are indeed acts of creation.
As an analogy, consider the case of color, understood as a secondary quality. On a
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simple version of this view, to be red is to appear red to a person under ordinary conditions.
In one sense, objects are not colored on this view—objects are not red from a God’s eye
perspective. However, it is not as though someone describing a tomato as red is making a
mistake or falling victim to an illusion in light of this fact. Rather, “being red” is a property
that makes essential reference to a potential observer. The present proposal is to treat
measurement outcomes (and other aspects of quantum models) similarly. They are not
features of external reality, but features of agents. These perspectival facts may ultimately
be grounded in facts about external reality, but the connection is not straightforward.16
Thus, the QBist can say that agents create their own worlds by performing measure-
ments without being compelled to deny that agents inhabit a single reality. The former
should be viewed as a non-metaphysical claim to be assessed in the context of the situated
perspective while the latter should be viewed as a metaphysical claim about objective re-
ality. Now, it may be thought that QBism’s rejection of the God’s eye perspective renders
QBists unable to say anything about objective reality, but this cannot be right. For as
we have seen, QBists wish to claim that there is an external reality independent of our
thoughts of it (this is what kicks back when we prod it) and that we can know certain
things about it (e.g., that it supports our use of the Born rule). The denial of a God’s
eye description is a claim about the limits of quantum theory, not the impossibility of
metaphysics by other means.
16Cf., Evans (2020) who uses the example of color to motivate what he calls “perspectival objectivity,”
which refers to “a scenario in which some feature of the world is in part a function of the agent perspective
while at the same time, given such a perspective that is inescapably shared between similar agents, there
is an (intersubjectively) objective fact of the matter concerning that feature” (2020, p.19).
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5 Normativity
There is a sense in which any interpretation of quantum theory has normative implications,
namely, that one should expect to find what the formalism predicts. However, on many
interpretations, such normative prescriptions follow from the truth of the description of
reality the theory is taken to provide. By contrast, on QBism, quantum normative claims
do not follow from a description of reality in any straightforward sense. Rather, quantum
theory is taken to be fundamentally normative, not descriptive. This is a point QBism
shares with other non-ontic approaches, such as Healey’s pragmatism. An important dif-
ference between the two views is in what they take the normative content, or prescriptions,
of quantum theory to be. For Healey, an agent’s quantum state ascriptions taken individ-
ually are subject to normative constraints; there is an objective fact about which quantum
state an agent should ascribe in a given physical context. QBists, however, only recognize
a relational normative constraint in the Born rule (in the form of the Essential Represen-
tation). As Fuchs (2017a) says, “[n]othing is sacred except that [an agent] should strive to
satisfy the Born Rule for all probabilities” (p.13). What both views share is that quantum
theory imposes objective normative constraints on all agents (see Healey (2017a)).
If we take this seriously, it has important implications for the questions of realism
about quantum theory. In particular, if it is a normative theory, then realism about
quantum theory is a form of normative realism. And while there is much controversy
surrounding normative realism, at least some prominent philosophers have advocated a
position analogous to QBism’s take on quantum theory. Consider, for instance, how T.M.
Scanlon characterizes his version of normative realism:
...the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about what
the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a prac-
tical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do. Metaphysical
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questions about the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong are impor-
tant only if answers to them are required in order to show how these judgments
can have this practical significance. (Scanlon, 1998, p.2)
For Scanlon, moral metaphysics is only relevant to the extent that it is needed to account
for the prescriptions of morality. For QBists, who view quantum theory normatively, the
parallel point is that quantum metaphysics is only relevant to the extent that one needs
it to account for the prescriptions of quantum theory—i.e., the constraints imposed by
the Born rule. As long as one can provide such an account, there are some grounds for
regarding the view as a form of realism. After all, it maintains that the dictates of quantum
theory are objective and is able to say why they are important.17
5.1 Grounding Normativity
QBism maintains that the significance of the Born rule—formulated purely in terms of
subjective probabilities—is to tell us what we have reason to do. If this role can be
sustained without getting involved in metaphysical questions, then QBism can maintain
some measure of objectivity without making substantial claims about external reality.
However, there is an obvious problem with such a claim in the context of quantum theory
(whether it is successful in ethics is another question): How, without providing a description
of the world, can we say that we have reason to do what the Born rule prescribes? Without
an answer to this question, the scientific realist will be unsatisfied as the central (normative)
content of the theory is left unaccounted for.
One strategy for grounding the normative prescriptions issued by quantum theory is
inductive in nature. It says that we should do as quantum theory recommends because (1)
17Whether one regards such a normative realism as scientific realism is another matter. I will simply
assume that if one is a realist with respect to a scientific theory, then one is a (local) scientific realist. In
the present case, if quantum theory is a normative theory as QBists claim, then normative realism about
quantum theory is sufficient for scientific realism about quantum theory.
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this is what it is to accept quantum theory and (2) we should accept quantum theory on
the basis of its past success. This is the approach of Healey (2017b).
To accept quantum theory is to commit oneself to setting credence in each
significant canonical magnitude claim equal to the probability specified by a
legitimate application of the Born rule based on the best available quantum
model, in the absence of more direct access to the truth value of the claim.
(Healey, 2017b, p.131)
He goes on to defend point (2):
The strongest reason to accept quantum theory is provided by the success of its
applications in predicting and explaining physical phenomena of a statistical
nature. If we set credences in accordance with the Born rule we are led to
expect and can come to understand the patterns displayed by these statistics.
(Healey, 2017b, p.131)
However, it’s not clear that this strategy is available to the QBist. First, measurement
outcomes are not objective features of reality according to QBism, so there are no objec-
tive frequencies to appeal to. Each agent will have their own memories of measurement
experiences, which are the result of their interactions with the world, but will differ be-
tween agents. Second, the Born rule alone doesn’t make any predictions. One needs to
supplement the Born rule with a quantum state ascription—or the probability of another
measurement outcome in the Essential Representation—to arrive at a specific probability.
This relational nature of the Born rule means that measurement statistics cannot bear on it
directly. This isn’t a problem for Healey, as he maintains that quantum state ascription is
objective (though relational), but QBists demur.18 So, it seems QBism lacks the resources
18Presumably, other interpretations would also be able to appeal to quantum theory’s track record. The
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to offer an inductive grounding of the Born rule.19
Instead, QBists adopt a strategy for grounding normativity that borrows from the sub-
jectivist tradition in probability. Bruno de Finetti famously denied that there is anything in
external reality corresponding to our judgments of probabilities, and hence, was compelled
to offer an alternative account of the axioms of probability theory. This alternative was
the Dutch book approach, which views the probability axioms as coherence constraints. In
terms of betting behavior, if one doesn’t adhere to the axioms, they will be vulnerable to a
“Dutch book”: a series of fair bets in which they are guaranteed to lose money regardless of
which outcomes obtain (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937). Of course, there needn’t be any
actual “Dutch bookies” lurking. The point is rather that the possibility of such sequences
of bets reveals an internal inconsistency in one’s degrees of belief.
Fuchs and Schack (2013) argue that the Essential Representation of the Born rule
should be viewed in along the same lines:
It expresses a kind of ‘empirically extended coherence’ not implied by Dutch-
book coherence alone, but formally similar to the kind of relation one gets from
Dutch-book coherence. (Fuchs and Schack, 2013, p.1702)
The proposal is to afford the Born rule a similar status to the axioms of probability theory
difference is that the standard realist interpretations also appeal to the fact that the world is as quantum
theory describes it to be. Healey’s view, by contrast, maintains only that quantum theory’s past success
grounds our commitment to its prescriptions. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
19While QBism is able to accommodate the measurement results that form the inductive evidence for
quantum theory, it cannot ground our use of the Born rule in these data. Measurement outcomes are
elements of subjective experience on QBism, and as such are completely unconstrained. Now, some agents
may happen to have past experiences that conform to the Born rule, but there is no guarantee of this.
Moreover, the Born rule requires a particular quantum state assignment (or, in the case of the Essential
Representation, the probability of an additional hypothetical measurement) to generate a specific probabil-
ity. So, the most one can appeal to here are subjective measurement records in conformity with the Born
rule when supplemented with certain subjective quantum state assignments (or subjective measurement
probabilities). This fails to provide an inductive grounding that is objective in the sense of providing a
compelling reason for all agents to use quantum theory. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this
worry.
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taken subjectively; if we don’t follow the Born rule in our subjective degrees of belief, we
are being incoherent. In terms of betting behavior, violating the Born rule opens one up
to the possibility of a Dutch book that guarantees a sure loss. There is a crucial difference
between the cases, however: the quantum Dutch book, unlike the standard Dutch book,
requires more than logic and mathematics. The quantum Dutch book applies only in a
world relevantly similar to ours—one in which quantum theory provides a good guide for
agents in it.
But what is it about our world that makes the Born rule the objectively correct coher-
ence constraint? QBists have two sorts of replies to this question. First, they may leave
this as a brute feature of reality. That the Born rule acts as a coherence constraint is the
limit of what we can say about the world. As Fuchs says, it is “nature’s whisper” (Fuchs,
2017b, p.6). Sometimes QBists express a desire to say more, but note that QBism is an
active research project, and as such, does not have all of the answers at present. So, a
second approach is to seek out the features of our world that necessitate the use of the Born
rule. One way to do this would be to derive the Born rule from logic and mathematics
supplemented with a minimal empirical claim. However, it’s hard to see what resources
the QBist has at their disposal for this task. For instance, consider the approach of a non-
QBist, Pitowsky (2003), who argues that quantum probability (i.e., the Born rule) follows
from rational betting on quantum gambles. The empirical premise in Pitowsky’s derivation
is the assumption that the algebra formed by the outcomes of incompatible quantum mea-
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surements has a non-Boolean structure.20 But, such a claim is incompatible with QBism’s
subjective understanding of measurement outcomes, which places no constraints on what
an individual may experience. So, while such a derivation may eventually be possible, it’s
presently unclear what empirical premises would be involved. At present, then, QBism
must rest content with the first approach: it is a brute fact that the Born rule acts as a
coherence constraint.
This picture may be unsatisfying for traditional scientific realists, but recall that ac-
cording to QBism quantum theory is, first and foremost, a normative theory. Hence, the
version of realism according to which it should be assessed is one appropriate for normative
theories. If we follow the approach suggested by Scanlon, such a realism must account for
the reason-giving force of the prescriptions of the theory in question—in this case, those
following from the Born rule. The Dutch book approach does this. Because it is an objec-
tive coherence constraint for agents in a world like ours, the Born rule gives us reason to
set our credences in conformity with it. Now, one may wish to know why the Born rule
acts as a coherence constraint in our world and, for the moment, there is very little the
QBist can say here. But, again, this is unsurprising given that QBism rejects the idea that
quantum theory functions as a description of reality.
In sum, QBism should be understood as a perspectival normative realism according to
which quantum theory is prescriptive rather than descriptive, and perspectival rather than
20More specifically, a quantum gamble proceeds in four stages:
1. A single physical system is prepared by the bookie.
2. A finite set M of incompatible measurements is announced by the bookie, and the agent is asked to
place bets on possible outcomes of each one of them.
3. One of the measurements in the set M is chosen by the bookie and the money placed on all other
measurements is promptly returned to the agent.
4. The chosen measurement is performed and the agent gains or loses in accordance with his bet on
that measurement.
The empirical assumption is that the quantum gambler is aware of the Boolean algebras corresponding
to the outcomes of two incompatible measurements. When considered together, these outcomes form a
non-Boolean algebra (Pitowsky, 2003, pp. 396–397).
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applied from the God’s eye view. Whether such a position counts as realism depends on the
existence of grounds for the normative claims involved in quantum theory, so understood.
The inductive approach is unavailable to the QBist, but the Dutch book approach provides
another option. For now, QBism is unable to identify the specific features of our world
that ground its use, but the Dutch book approach may nevertheless account for why we
should set our credences in accordance with the Born rule.
6 Conclusion: Meeting Realist Demands
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the relation of QBism to scientific realism.
The conclusion we have reached is partially negative: standard ways of thinking about
scientific realism are an unhappy fit with QBism. While QBism may perhaps be viewed as
a limiting case of selective scientific realism—one in which almost no aspects of quantum
theory correspond to elements of reality, the resultant picture is highly uninformative.
Standard scientific realism also fails to take seriously the perspectival and normative aspects
of QBism, according to which quantum theory does not offer a God’s eye description
of reality, but places objective normative constraints on agents. The question remains,
whether this perspectival normative realism suffices for scientific realism.
There are several criteria that could be used to demarcate scientific realisms from
antirealisms. If these include a commitment to providing a substantive description of
reality from the God’s eye view, QBism straightforwardly fails. But, such accounts may
be seen as question-begging given QBism’s rejection of this conception of what quantum
theory aims to do. But other criteria seem more central to scientific realism. For instance,
realism is often associated with the ability to provide explanations of certain phenomena.
Some have objected to QBism on precisely these grounds:
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...QBism seems explanatorily inert. For scientific explanations typically explain
phenomena in terms of underlying mechanisms. Here is a simple example. Why
is the Sun able to produce so much energy over such a long period of time?
(McQueen, 2017, p.7)
McQueen (2017) goes on to argue that QBism can provide no underlying physical mecha-
nism responsible for the sun’s energy production (presumably because our understanding
of the nuclear processes involved depends on quantum models which fail to describe reality
according to QBism). But, it’s question-begging to demand of QBism that it provides
causal-mechanistic explanations of quantum phenomena, given that one of its central fea-
tures is a rejection of quantum theory’s alleged descriptive role. Moreover, QBism can offer
a certain kind of explanation of phenomena in the scope of quantum theory: the QBist can
note that quantum theory tells agents that they should expect to find certain things.21 Mc-
Queen considers such an explanation of his case, but quickly rejects it for failing to account
for why we should expect these phenomena to occur (ibid.). And so we are back to the
question of grounding the objective normative prescriptions of quantum theory. McQueen
assumes that a description of reality based in quantum theory is needed to fully account
for the phenomena about which it advises agents, but as we have seen, there are alternative
ways to ground normativity.
The adequacy of the explanations licensed by QBism is an open question, and an
issue that may motivate some to reject QBism. The central point here is that to dismiss
QBism’s claim to realism on the basis of a lack of causal-mechanistic explanations is to
assume the standard conception of scientific realism. Above, I have argued that this is not
the appropriate conception of realism for a view that takes quantum theory to be radically
21Recall that the normative prescriptions of quantum theory are solely relational according to QBism,
so explanations will take the form of prescribed relations between beliefs. Nevertheless, in many cases,
quantum theory is capable of telling agents that they should expect to attain certain results in light of their
other beliefs.
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perspectival and fundamentally normative.
By way of conclusion, consider again Scanlon’s moral realism.22 Shortly after the quo-
tation above, Scanlon outlines two worries for realism about ethics without an underlying
moral metaphysics:
One worry would be that there may be no right answer to questions of right
and wrong... A second interpretation of the charge that judgments of right
and wrong are not about anything “real” would take it as the claim that they
should not have this importance. This is a charge that any account of the
reason-giving force of judgments of right and wrong needs to meet. (Scanlon,
1998, pp.2–3)
Applied to QBism, the first worry is that the QBist cannot maintain that there are ob-
jectively correct answers to questions about how to set our credences. The second worry
is that only an adequate description of the world can account for the reason-giving force
of quantum theory and the Born rule. QBism meets the first challenge by regarding the
Born rule—in the form of the Essential Representation and together with the probabil-
ity axioms—as an objective coherence constraint. While there are not correct answers to
individual probability judgments, there are constrains on the set of admissible credence
functions, namely, that they must conform to the Born rule. The second challenge is met
by the Dutch book approach. The prescriptions of the Born rule have importance because
22I’ve only considered a small part of Scanlon’s views here. One might wonder whether other aspects of his
views may be usefully applied to QBism. For instance, according to his contractualism, ethical principles
are justified by the fact that no reasonable person can deny their truth. Could QBists take a similar
attitude toward quantum theory? Is the Born rule a normative constraint that no reasonable person can
deny? Possibly, but if so its undeniability is parasitic on a grounding of the sort considered above. Absent
such a grounding, there is little reason to suppose that the Born rule is rationally undeniable. Indeed,
the very reason we seek such a grounding is to account for the apparent reason-giving force of quantum
theory. Thus, while other aspects of Scanlon’s view may be helpful in further developing QBism, the key
idea for present purposes is simply that realism about a normative theory needn’t require an underlying
metaphysics. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
26
all rational agents are compelled to adhere to them, in the same manner as the axioms
of subjective probability theory. Unlike the probability axioms, there is no a priori proof
for quantum theoretic constraints, but QBists maintain that they capture an empirically
extended sense of rational coherence. According to QBism, quantum theory provides cor-
rect answers to questions about what we should do, and provides us with reasons to do as
it prescribes. Thus, it would seem that QBism can meet the demands of a conception of
realism appropriate for a normative theory.
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